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Abstract 
Good public infrastructure management means more than increasing 
the quantity of infrastructure stocks; it also involves improving the 
quality of infrastructure. This study seeks to document the quality of 
infrastructure projects in China’s villages and to measure whether or not 
quality has suffered as China’s investment effort has risen. Using data 
from 100 villages in China, we have found, using descriptive results, 
that in recent years both the quantity and the quality of infrastructure 
investments have increased over time. We also demonstrate that across 
space quantity and quality are positively correlated. We conclude that—
at least in our sample villages—the quality of infrastructure is not being 
compromised for its quantity expansion during the entire sample period. 
JEL classification: H41; H54; H71 
Keywords: Quality; Quantity; Infrastructure; Investment; Rural China 
By any measure, China has achieved impressive gains in the expansion of its 
rural infrastructure in recent years. Rural roads registered a rapid rate of 
increase in investment between 2001 and 2004, from 35.8 billion yuan to 
124.2 billion yuan, an annual growth rate of 51 per cent (Ministry of 
Communications, 2005). By 2006 61 per cent of villages became connected 
into their town’s road network by a paved road. Investments in irrigation 
systems and drinking water facilities also rose sharply (Ministry of Water 
Resources, 2005). From 2001 to 2004, the share of villages with access to tap 
water increased by 15 per cent. Since the late 1990s, more than 100 million 
people have enjoyed upgrades in their electrical and telecommunications 
infrastructure (China Agricultural Statistics Yearbook, 2005). 
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Despite the gains of recent years, national leaders are designing even more 
ambitious plans. One of the main policy initiatives of the current 
administration is the “Building a New Socialist Countryside” movement. 
Continued improvement in rural infrastructure is among the main goals. 
According to the recently created Rural Road Development Plan, during the 
11th five-year period (2006–10), the national government will invest a total of 
100 billion yuan in rural roads (Ministry of Communications, 2006). During this 
same period, the leadership will allocate more than 40 billion yuan to drinking 
water facilities for rural communities (Ministry of Water Resources, 2005).  
While few observers dispute that vast new funds are flowing into rural 
China and that the absolute quantity of infrastructure investment is rising, a 
number of researchers have expressed their concerns about the quality of the 
infrastructure projects that are being built. For example, Zhao (2005) states 
that the rural infrastructure in China is at best characterized as being of “poor 
quality”. Several scholars have cautioned that, despite the fact that many 
villages in rural China have been linked with the outside world through the 
new road expansion movement, the quality of these roads is poor (Yang et al., 
2005; Huang and Xia, 2006). Their assessment is that many road projects 
have built roads that are too narrow. The pavement is too thin. Many of the 
new roads lack drainage systems. Even after only a few years, some roads 
are full of cracks. An assessment team from the Henan Provincial Bureau of 
Statistics (2005) characterizes the irrigation systems in part of the province’s 
rural areas as seriously flawed. In many villages in Sichuan and Chongqing 
where drinking water facilities are failing, rural residents and their animals 
have been reported to be suffering from drought (People’s Daily, 2006). In 
short, no matter how many projects are built, if their quality is poor, the 
benefits to rural communities will be lower and the quality of life may not rise 
at all.  
International experience also shows that good infrastructure management 
means more than increasing the quantity of infrastructure stocks; it also 
involves improving the quality of infrastructure (World Bank, 1994). Failures in 
producing quality infrastructure can reduce the quality of life and productivity 
in rural communities. Bell et al. (1993) argue that, when drinking water 
facilities are of poor quality, they can reduce labor productivity and household 
income and undermine poverty alleviation efforts. According to a survey of 
power generation projects in a number of developing countries, an average of 
40 per cent of the power-generating capacity is unavailable at any given time 
because of the poor quality of projects (World Bank, 1994). According to the 
World Bank (1994), costly investments into road construction are often 
wasted because of poor quality. 
Despite the obvious importance of the subject, there is almost a complete 
absence of literature in China about the quality of rural infrastructure. Earlier 
studies focus almost exclusively on the benefits of investing in increasingly 
greater volumes of roads, irrigation systems and other physical infrastructure 
projects (for example, Fan et al., 2002). More recently, there have been 
several papers that center on documenting the expanding quantity of 
infrastructure in rural China as well as explaining why some villages invest a 
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lot and others invest a little (for example, Zhang et al., 2005, 2006a, 2006b; 
Luo et al., 2006). To date, however, beyond anecdotal reports (Zhao, 2005; 
Yang et al., 2005; Huang and Xia, 2006), little systematic empirical work has 
addressed the quality of infrastructure in rural China. 
The overall goal of this paper is to understand whether or not quality has 
suffered as the quantity of investment into rural China has risen. To achieve 
this modest goal, we will strive to meet three specific objectives. First, we use 
a new dataset to describe the trends in the quantity of infrastructure 
investment in rural China. The purpose of this part of the paper is to see if 
the investments that have been reported at the macro-level are penetrating 
to China’s villages. Second, we use special blocks of our dataset to document 
the quality of infrastructure in rural China. After constructing several 
measures of quality, we examine the nature of the heterogeneity in the 
quality of infrastructure over time and across space. Finally, we measure 
whether or not there is an inverse relationship between quantity and quality. 
As China’s infrastructure has expanded over time and across space, we want 
to answer the question: Has the quality of China’s infrastructure been 
adversely affected?  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
data we will use in this study. Section 3 documents that, in fact, during the 
past several years, there has been a marked rise in the quantity of 
infrastructure in rural China and that this investment has reached the villages. 
The main question of the paper, then, is to understand whether or not, during 
this same time period, the quality of infrastructure in communities which have 
experienced these large rises in infrastructure investment has suffered or not. 
To do this, in Section 4 we first describe special blocks of the data that our 
survey team collected specifically for measuring quality. Second, we introduce 
our measures of quality. Using the measures, we trace the contours of the 
quality of infrastructure projects in rural China, describing the patterns inside 
and across the villages in our sample and across time. Section 6 uses 
multivariate approaches to examine whether or not the quality of 
infrastructure is being compromised during the quantity expansion of 
infrastructure in rural China. The final section presents our conclusions.  
Data 
Our main empirical analysis draws information mainly from the 2005 China 
Rural Governance Survey (2005 CRG Survey) which we undertook in 
collaboration with colleagues at the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CCAP-CAS). In this survey, 100 villages were 
randomly selected from 50 towns in 25 counties from 5 provinces. The 
fieldwork team, made up of two of our long-time collaborators at CCAP and 
30 graduate students and research fellows, chose the sample and 
implemented the survey. The sample villages were selected as follows. First, 
five provinces were each randomly selected to represent five of China’s major 
agro–ecological zones: Jiangsu in the eastern coastal region; Sichuan in the 
southwest; Shaanxi in the northwest; Hebei in the central region; and Jilin in 
the northeast. Next, five counties were selected from each province, one from 
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each quintile from a list of counties arranged in descending order of per 
capita gross value of industrial output (GVIO). GVIO was used on the basis of 
the conclusions of Rozelle (1996) which shows that GVIO is one of the best 
predictors of standard of living and development potential and is often more 
reliable than net rural per capita income. Within each county, the survey team 
chose two townships, one from each half of a list of townships arranged in 
descending order of per capita GVIO. Finally, within each township, they 
chose two villages, following the same procedure as the township selection. 
The 2005 CRG Survey form had a block that measures the quantity of 
investment in our 100 sample villages. Enumerators interviewed village 
leaders, using a survey form designed to elicit information about the size and 
scope of investments. Enumerators asked questions about each infrastructure 
investment project that was undertaken in the village between 1998 and 2004. 
The survey also included questions on the year of project initiation and 
completion, its cost and sources of funding. This part of the survey (which 
was also administered to a larger set of 2,459 villages that the authors 
collected in 2003—described below) was the basis for the analysis on the 
quantity of infrastructure investments. The main part of the survey that we 
use to examine quality is described later in the paper. 
To analyze the changes in the quantity of infrastructure in rural China, we 
use a survey that preceded the 2005 CRG Survey, namely, the 2004 China 
Public Investment Survey (2004 CPI Survey) which we also undertook in 
collaboration with CCAP-CAS. The 2004 CPI Survey covered 2,459 villages in 6 
provinces randomly selected from around China.1 The 100 villages covered in 
the 2005 CRG Survey are a subset of villages randomly selected from the 
2,459 sample villages from the 2004 CPI Survey. Similar to the section 
described above, enumerators in the 2004 CPI Survey collected information 
about the size and scope of each infrastructure investment undertaken in the 
village between 1998 and 2003, their timing and sources of funding and 
implementation. In addition, a variety of background information was also 
collected on the economic, political and demographic conditions of each 
village in 1997 and 2003.  
                                                 
1 The sample villages come from six representative provinces. Jiangsu represents the eastern 
coastal areas (Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong); Sichuan 
represents the southwestern provinces (Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan) plus Guangxi; Shaanxi 
represents the provinces on the Loess Plateau (Shaanxi and Shanxi) and neighboring Inner 
Mongolia; Gansu represents the rest of the provinces in the northwest (Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai 
and Xinjiang); Hebei represents the north and central provinces (Hebei, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, 
Jiangxi and Hunan); and Jilin represents the northeastern provinces (Jilin, Liaoning and 
Heilongjiang). While we recognize that we have deviated from the standard definition of China’s 
agro–ecological zones, the realities of survey work justified our compromises. Pretests in 
Guangdong demonstrated that data collection was extraordinarily expensive and the attrition rate 
high. One of our funding agencies demanded that we choose at least two provinces in the 
northwest. Our budget did not allow us to add another central province (for example, Hunan or 
Hubei) to the sample. 
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Quantity of Investment in Rural Infrastructure 
Despite the suggestion by some that China’s rural villages are being neglected 
(Zhao, 2005; Ma and Fang, 2005), our surveys show a high and growing 
volume of investment in China’s rural infrastructure. They also show that the 
investment initiatives that are being reported in macro statistics are being 
funded in rural communities. In this way our data are consistent with many of 
the government reports on the expansion of the volume of investment into 
public infrastructure (for example, State Statistics Bureau, 2006). During the 
five years of our study, enumerators working on the CPI Survey recorded that 
there were 9,138 investment projects in the 2,459 sample villages. On 
average this means that during the 5-year sample period, each village had 
3.75 projects, nearly 1 per year. Nearly 90 per cent of villages in the sample 
had more than one investment project between 1998 and 2003.  
While it is hard to say if this level of investment is high enough to facilitate 
China’s modernization, compared to other developing countries, it appears 
that China in recent years is generating a relatively high degree of investment. 
For example, in a study by Khwaja (2002), after canvassing several hundred 
villages in Northern Pakistan, enumerators found that only 99 villages had at 
least one development project during the previous decade or more. Only 33 
villages had more than one project.  
In addition, China’s investment targets are increasingly focusing on 
investment into public goods. In the 1980s local leaders put a lot of their 
effort into managing village-run development projects (Rozelle, 1990). For 
example, during the 1980s and 1990s local leaders often took an active role in 
starting and running local enterprises instead of taking on more traditional 
regulatory and public goods management roles. In some parts of China the 
vast tracts of commercial timber forests, citrus and apple orchards and large-
scale livestock projects testify to the efforts of entrepreneurial village and 
township leaders who were trying to improve and diversify the economic 
bases of their communities. After 1998, however, our data show that leaders 
centered most of their energy on public goods-oriented investment projects 
(87 per cent).2 In value terms, more than 80 per cent of rural investment was 
spent on public goods.  
Leaders also invested in wide variety of infrastructure projects. Specifically, 
of the 5,975 public goods projects (not including the 3,163 electricity and 
communication projects), sample villages invested in fifteen different types of 
public goods investment projects (Table 1, column 1). The average size of 
                                                 
2 In calculating all public goods projects, we include investments made in electrical grid and 
telephone line upgrades. There were nearly 2000 of these projects in our sample villages between 
1998 and 2003. In some sense, however, these projects are not run like the rest of the projects, 
either public goods investments or development projects. For example, In a vast majority of the 
electrical grid upgrading projects, the electrical company made all of the investment and did not 
include the village in any of the decision making process. The cost of the project, according to our 
interviewees, would be captured by higher electricity fees or increased electricity use. Given the 
different nature of these types of projects, in the rest of the paper we do not include them in the 
analysis of public goods projects. Hence, this reduces the number of public goods projects from 
7950 to 5975. 
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each type of project was fairly small—108 thousand yuan (Table 1, column 
2)—although these vary from project to project (from a high for watershed 
management projects—298 thousand yuan—to projects such as clinics and 
village beautification that were only around 25 thousand yuan).  
Table 1. Number and size of public goods projects (regional population 
weighted), 1998–2003 
Project 
 
 
 
Number of Average size
(1000 yuan) projects 
 
 Accumulated 
distribution o
 
 
 
f 
projects 
 
Road/Bridge 1266 112 21.2 
Grain for Green 892 67 36.1 
School 850 99 50.3 
Irrigation/Drainage 819 65 64.1 
Drinking water 636 75 74.7 
Loudspeaker for village committee 379 60 81.0 
Activity/Recreation center 262 50 85.4 
Clinic 163 25 88.2 
Beautify environment 157 24 90.8 
Watershed management 151 298 93.3 
Forest closure 140 34 95.6 
Land Leveling 124 136 97.7 
Eco-forest 55 34 98.6 
Soil improvement 52 110 99.5 
Building grazing pasture 19 134 99.8 
Other infrastructure projects 10 244 100.0 
    
N / mean 5,975 108 -- 
Source: Authors’ survey. 
Some types of investment projects, however, were much more popular 
than others and, in fact, a large majority of all public goods investment 
projects were made in one of five categories (Table 1, columns 1 and 3). For 
example, over half of the villages (1,266) invested in roads or bridges. Roads 
and bridges accounted for 21.2 per cent of all of public goods projects. 
Between 800 and 900 villages invested in Grain for Green, school construction 
or irrigation and drainage projects. 3  More than 600 villages invested in 
drinking water projects. In total, 75 per cent of all public goods projects were 
                                                 
3 Grain for Green is a large national forestry program begun in 1999 that was designed to pay 
farmers to set aside cultivated land and plant forest or grasslands. In total between 1999 and 
2003, more than 5 million hectares nationally were converted from cultivated land to forests and 
grasslands (Xu and Cao, 2002). 
 
 - 7 - 
accounted for by investment into these five investment activities. The top five 
projects—roads and bridges, Grain for Green, irrigation, school construction 
and drinking water—also commanded a large share of total investment. Of all 
investment in value terms, leaders invested 81 per cent of their funds in the 
top five projects. The fact that roads/bridges, irrigation and drinking water 
accounted for 43 per cent of all projects and 46 per cent of investment 
justifies our putting these three types of infrastructure projects at the center 
of the quality analysis. In the rest of the paper we refer to these three types 
of projects as core infrastructure projects.  
Most importantly, when we look at trends in the expansion of the volume 
(or quantity) of infrastructure investment in rural China over time, our data 
show contours that are consistent with the quantity expansion reported by 
the government in their macro-level data (which was referred to in the 
introduction). Rural roads registered the highest growth rates. For example, 
the length of paved roads within villages increased by 29.7 per cent per year. 
Between 1997 and 2004, the length of paved rural roads increased from 0.2 
kilometers per thousand people to 0.9 (Figure 1, Panel A). The fraction of 
households with access to tap water also increased during this period from 
less than one third (31 per cent) to more than half (54 per cent). The share of 
effectively irrigated land in the typical village also rose (from 42 per cent to 54 
per cent—Figure 1, Panel B). Clearly, our data, which are measuring 
investment into villages within the boundaries of villages, are consistent with 
the story of quantity expansion that is found in the secondary data. 
Figure 1. Expansion in the Quantity of Infrastructure in Rural China 
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Source: Authors’ survey. 
Quality of Investment in Rural Infrastructure 
Although it is clear that there has been a large rise in the total volume of 
investment into China’s rural infrastructure, these figures do not tell us 
anything about their quality since the quantity of rural infrastructure is not 
necessarily equal to quality. To explore shifts in the quality of rural China’s 
infrastructure, in this section we first describe special blocks of the data that 
were collected specifically for measuring quality. Second, we describe the 
various measures of quality that we use. Finally, we trace the contours of the 
quality of infrastructure projects in rural China and explore whether quality is 
suffering when quantity is expanding.  
Data for Measuring Quality 
In total there are three blocks of the survey concerned with issues of the 
quality of investment that are used in the study. In collaboration with our 
colleagues at CCAP-CAS, we designed two of the blocks to focus exclusively 
on the quality of the investment. The first of these blocks asked village 
leaders a series of questions about the core infrastructure investment projects 
in the village. During the survey, enumerators asked detailed questions about 
each of the three types of core infrastructure projects, including who initiated 
the project, the application process, the design of the project and project 
implementation. With such detailed information about each project, we are 
able to understand a lot about the entire “life” of the project from its 
inception through its completion.  
In another block of the survey, two of the enumeration team members 
utilized a survey instrument that was designed by us and our colleagues at 
CCAP-CAS in consultation with professional civil engineers to come up with a 
quality index for each project. Each evaluation form assesses two dimensions 
of each infrastructure project: an engineering dimension and a performance 
dimension. In attempting to describe each of these dimensions, we created a 
long list of project attributes. Specifically, there are 40 attributes used on the 
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form for each road project, 42 attributes for each irrigation project and 37 
attributes for each drinking water project.  
The form that we used to evaluate the quality of each core infrastructure 
project was created to look like a score sheet. A number of points was assigned 
to each attribute. The number of points assigned to each attribute was supposed 
to reflect the importance of the contribution of the attribute to the project’s 
overall quality. For example, the depth of the road surface and the material used 
to construct the road surface was assigned 12.5 points (accounting for more 
than 10 per cent of a road’s quality). In contrast, the “line of the road”, which 
was measured by the enumerator based on a visual inspection of “how straight” 
a road looks (or how symmetric the curves are), was only assigned 4 points. The 
number of points (or weights) was assigned this way because it was the opinion 
of our engineering consultants that the road surface was a much more important 
factor in the quality of a road than whether or not the line of the road was 
perfectly straight or nicely curved. If project’s attributes all received full score, 
the score would add to 100. English translations of the forms for roads, irrigation 
and drinking water projects are included in the appendix. 
We were quite concerned that, despite the effort put into creating the detailed 
evaluation form, there could possibly be a great deal of enumerator-specific 
subjectiveness in the assigning of scores to each attribute. To overcome this, our 
colleagues and we trained the enumerators intensively as a group, playing many 
“comparison games” that were designed to get every enumerator assigning the 
same (or nearly the same) number of points to the same types of attributes. We 
also created a detailed scoring manual that was used by each of the 
enumeration teams. Finally, the survey team took literally thousands of 
photographs of the projects. Hence, after the survey was completed we were 
able to look at the pictures of the projects and compare them against their 
scores. In this way, we were able to make adjustments to projects ex post when 
they looked to be out of line with the projects that ranked immediately ahead 
and behind them.  
The information about the performance dimension of the quality measure was 
also enumerated by the evaluation team. Households were randomly selected 
and asked about the performance and reliability of the roads, irrigation networks 
and drinking water systems. For example, in the case of roads we asked the 
villagers how many days per year a road was not usable (due to rain or mud or 
some other factor). Enumerators also asked if the flow of traffic was ever 
impeded because the road was too narrow or the surface impassable. In the 
case of the drinking water systems, enumerators used litmus test paper to test 
for acidity and glass test tubes to check for the clarity of water. As in the case of 
roads, enumerators also asked about reliability (for example, how many months 
per year, days per month and hours per day did the drinking water system 
deliver water?). Enumerators also asked farmers about their perception of the 
irrigation system’s reliability. 
A third block of the survey was designed to ask farmers about their 
perceptions about the quality of projects and their satisfaction with the outcome 
of the investment activities. The purpose of the survey was to come up with a 
measure that would allow us to see if there was any correlation between farmer 
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satisfaction and project quality. In other words, we were trying to elicit 
information that would allow us to understand if the measures of quality are 
correlated with the perceptions of farmers about whether or not the projects 
were successful.  
To collect the information on farmer satisfaction, eight farm households were 
randomly selected from each sample village. Enumerators interviewed each 
household inside their homes. For each infrastructure project undertaken in the 
village between 1998 and 2004, enumerators asked farmers whether they 
thought the project was successful or not. In addition, enumerators also asked 
farmers to rank the projects in their village on the basis of their benefits to the 
villagers.  
Constructing the Measures 
The most straightforward measure of quality that we use, the standard raw 
score, is the simple sum of the scores of each of the project attributes. Therefore, 
the standard raw score ranges from 0 to 100. In some projects, however, the 
scope of work only involved a subset of the attributes of a project. In this case 
the project’s score was standardized so it too ranged between 0 and 100 points. 
The standardization was accomplished by dividing the sum of the score given by 
the enumerators by the total number of points available for the attributes that 
were relevant to the project. For example, if an irrigation project only involved 
replacing the pump (worth 15 points if the attribute was judged to meet the 
criteria for a full score), intake gates (2 points) and main head-works (8 points), 
the total possible points would be 25. Such a project would have nothing to do 
with the rest of the irrigation system (for example, the tertiary canals, outlet 
gates to farmer fields and/or the drainage system—worth 75 points). Because of 
this partial nature, there was no way that points could be assigned for these 
other attributes. It is for this reason that we standardized the score by dividing 
the sum of the points assigned to each of the relevant attributes by the total 
maximum number of points for the attributes (had they been given a full score). 
For example, in the case of the partial irrigation project, if the enumerator 
decided that the scores assigned to the 3 relevant attributes added to 20, the 
standard raw score would be 20/25*100, or 80 points. 
Accounting for the “Degree of Difficulty” 
For a number of reasons, we believe the standard raw score measures may not 
always account for the complete context within which a project is designed and 
implemented. In other words, in some places projects are difficult to implement; 
in other places they are relatively easy. Some projects are simple in design; 
others are relatively complicated. In some places villagers and their leaders have 
to work hard to implement a project; in others they are given a “turn-key” 
operation and the villagers benefit from a project without any effort on their own 
collective account. As a consequence, it is possible that the standard raw score 
measure of quality is a function of either the environment of a village’s 
infrastructure project and/or the complexity of the project.4 In such a case the 
                                                 
4 A simple example can illustrate the importance of accounting of the difficulty factors. If we 
merely use the standard raw score, then a village might be penalized for attempting a complex 
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standard raw scores would not be comparable among all villages in our sample 
(in terms of being able to compare the ability of villages to implement quality 
projects).  
Because of these concerns, we developed a new measure of quality. To 
create this measure, we began with the standard raw score of a project, and in 
the same way as an Olympic diving score is adjusted for the difficulty of the dive, 
we adjusted the investment project’s quality measure for three elements: a) the 
degree of physical or geographical difficulty facing those charged with project 
construction; b) the complexity of the project; and c) the degree to which local 
residents participated in the design and implementation of the project. In other 
words, we sought to make our measures of quality more sensitive to the context 
within which each project was designed and implemented by adjusting the 
standard raw score for each project’s physical difficulty, its complexity and the 
degree of local participation. The new measure is called the adjusted score.5 
Compared to standard raw scores, adjusted scores have the advantage of being 
more comparable across villages and projects that are designed and 
implemented in different environments and with different inputs from outside the 
village. 
Also in the same way that Olympic diving scores are created, the adjusted 
measure is created by applying additive weights to the standard raw score. Each 
of the three adjustment elements— one for physical/geographical difficulty; one 
for complexity; and one for local participation—ranged from 1 to 1.5. The higher 
the additive weight, the more physically challenging the terrain (or the more 
complex was the project or the more autonomous was the village’s effort). 
Enumerators assigned weights on the basis of a criteria sheet that was also 
designed in consultations with our engineering consultants. Because standard 
raw scores (SRS) ranged between 0 and 100, adjusted scores (AS) of quality 
ranged from 0 to 450 (AS=SRS*(1.5+1.5+1.5), if the project was built on 
physically demanding terrain, was complex, and was built entirely at the initiative 
and with the resources of the village leadership. A summary of these adjustment 
factors by province, project inception year and project type is provided in 
Appendix Table 1.  
The Quality of Rural China’s Infrastructure Projects 
Regardless of our measure of quality, the 2005 CRG Survey data show that as 
the overall volume of infrastructure investment rose, quality (in the aggregate) 
did not suffer (at least when we look at simple trends). In fact, the quality of 
infrastructure projects in rural China increases slightly during the sample 
period. From 1998 to 2003, the standard raw scores of infrastructure projects 
in rural China increased from 70 to 75 (Figure 2, Panel A). Similar results are 
                                                                                                                                            
project (for example, a road network linking all small groups in the village together). The penalty 
would be even more severe if the village were located in a physically challenging environment (for 
example, in a mountainous area). In contrast, a village implementing a simple project (for 
example, a short segment of a feeder road linking a nearby county road to the village office) in a 
village that was located on a plain would have an easier time achieving a higher score.  
5 Each of the three adjustment elements ranges from 0 to 1.5. Recall that standard raw score 
ranges between 0 and 100. Therefore, adjusted score ranges from 0 to 450. 
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found when using the adjusted scores. During the same time period, the 
adjusted scores increased from 258 to 272 (Figure 2, Panel B). Hence, using 
either the standard raw or adjusted score measures, our approach to 
measuring quality does not support the conclusions of others (Zhao, 2005; 
Yang et al., 2005; Huang and Xia, 2006) who claim that quality was suffering 
during the recent period of investment expansion. 
Figure 2. Increase in the Quality of Infrastructure over Time, China 
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Source: Authors’ survey. 
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The positive relationship between rising quantity and quality can also be seen 
when we examine the quality of infrastructure projects by province. The scores 
rose in all provinces—although at different rates in different provinces. For 
example, in Sichuan province, one of the poor provinces in China, the standard 
raw score of infrastructure projects increased from 65 in 1998 to 71 in 2003. A 
similar pattern appears in Jiangsu, one of the better-off provinces in China. The 
standard raw score of infrastructure projects in Jiangsu increased from 70 in 
1998 to 75 in 2003 (Figure 3, Panel A).The rising pattern of infrastructure 
projects across provinces of our sample also holds when using the adjusted 
scores. During the same time period, the adjusted raw score of infrastructure 
projects province increased from 237 to 263 in Sichuan. In Jiangsu the adjusted 
raw score rose from 248 to 267 (Figure 3, Panel B). 
Figure 3. Increase in the Quality of Infrastructure over Time, Jiangsu and 
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Correlations between Measures of Infrastructure Quality and Farmer 
Satisfaction 
One question arises when looking at project quality. Is the quality of projects 
something that farmers observe and/or demand? To answer this question, we 
take advantage of the information that enumerators collected in the 
household part of the survey to create two measures of farmer satisfaction 
with the project. The first satisfaction measure, SMi, is the average of a binary 
evaluation of project quality by eight sample farmers in each village. The 
question that enumerators asked was: Do you believe that <such and such 
project> could be called “successful”? We then took the answer from each of 
the j=8 households (SMij=1, if household j believed project i was successful 
and SMij=0 if they believe the project was not) and created SMi as the sum of 
SMij/8.  
The other satisfaction measure is a subjective project benefit ranking index 
that was constructed by a normalization procedure used by McPeak et al. 
(2006). To explain how this measure was created, let i denote project 
(i=1,…,N) where N denotes the total number of projects undertaken in this 
village during sample period. We then define a new variable, Ri, which 
represents the rank order of each individual project among all of the projects 
that were implemented in the village during the study period. Based on these 
definitions, we can produce a measure of the benefit ranking index of project 
i, denoted as RIi, as RIi = [1-(Ri-1)/N]*100.6  
To illustrate how this measure works, suppose that there is a village in 
which a total of 8 projects were undertaken during 1998-2004. Also suppose 
that a farmer from this village ranked a particular road project 3rd among all 
of the village’s 8 projects. From the farmer’s point of view, the benefit ranking 
index (RIi) of this road project would be 75 [=(
3 11
8
−
− )*100]. This means the 
farmer believed that this road project in his/her village brought local residents 
more benefits than 75 per cent of all other projects undertaken in this village 
during the sample period.  
Using the first measure of farmer satisfaction, SMi, our data demonstrate 
that farmers are largely satisfied with the infrastructure projects that were 
constructed in their villages between 1998 and 2004. During the sample 
period SMi=0.91. This means that, on average, 91 per cent of farmers stated 
that they believed that the infrastructure projects in their villages were 
“successful”. Across China’s provinces, SMi ranges from 0.82 in Sichuan and 
Shaanxi (the two lowest provinces) to 0.97 in Jilin.  
                                                 
6 It can be shown quite easily that, by definition, the benefit ranking index of an average project 
would be greater than 50 per cent (or 0.5).  
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According to our other measure of farmer satisfaction, RIi, farmers appear 
to be somewhat more satisfied with the core projects when comparing them 
to the non-core projects. On average, the core projects are in the 69th 
percentile. In other words, the typical core infrastructure project in our 
sample is better than 69 per cent of all of the projects undertaken in the 
village in terms of benefits that farmers believed the projects brought to the 
village.  
Importantly, for our analysis, our data also show that farmer satisfaction and 
project quality are positively correlated. For example, the correlation coefficient 
between the ranking of a project’s benefit (RIi) and its standard raw score (SRSi) 
is 0.21; it is 0.23 between RIi and the adjusted score (ASi). The correlation 
coefficients are both significantly different than zero at the 10 per cent level. 
Since our data show that the quality of a project is correlated with farmer 
satisfaction, we believe it is possible to infer from this that quality is at least 
somewhat related to the welfare that rural households derived from the 
infrastructure project. 
We find similar results when we examine the relationship between our 
other measure of farmer satisfaction (SMi) and project quality. To examine 
this relationship we divide our core projects into two types and compare their 
quality: those in which all eight farmers believe that the project is successful 
(or SMi = 1.00). We call this type of project a unanimously successful project). 
The other type of project is one in which less than eight farmers believe that 
the project is successful (or SMi<1.00). We call this type of project a not-
unanimously successful one. According to our data, unanimously successful 
projects tend to have higher quality (in terms of the SRS and AS measures). 
Specifically, on average, the standard raw score of the unanimously 
successfully projects is 73. The standard raw score of the not-unanimously 
successful projects is 68. This difference is significant at the five per cent level. 
From examining the simple descriptive correlation analyses between farmer 
satisfaction and project quality, it is clear that we need to keep several issues 
in mind when we are interpreting our results. Although significant, the 
correlations between farmer satisfaction and project quality, while positive, 
are still relatively low. Why is this? Of course one possibility is that our indices 
of quality are measured with substantial error. It could also be that, while 
farmers equate the success of a project with its quality, there are other 
factors that they also value (such as the size of the project). It is possible that 
while farmers value quality, they do not want a project in which the quality 
standard was set too high (assuming that quality comes at a cost). Although 
there is little we can do in this paper to correct for these shortcomings and 
uncertainties, at the very least this needs to be remembered when 
interpreting the results. 
Is Quality Being Compromised During Quantity Expansion? 
In this section, our primary purpose is to examine whether or not there is a 
negative relationship between the quality and the quantity of infrastructure in 
rural China’s villages and to do so in a way that is more rigorous than above. 
We will address this question on two different levels. First, we test whether or 
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not there is a negative quality–quantity relationship at the project level within 
village. In other words, we want to see if a village invests in two projects, 
whether or not the larger one is higher or lower quality than the smaller one, 
ceteris paribus. We will call this the within village quantity–quality tradeoff or 
for short the within village measure. Second, we then examine whether or not 
when one village invests more in quantity terms the average quality of the 
investments is hurt or enhanced compared to a village that invests less. We 
will call this the inter-village measure of the quantity-quality tradeoff. 
Within village quality–quantity tradeoff 
To examine the within village quality–quantity tradeoff we do a series of 
multivariate analyses. We start simply, by regressing the standard raw scores 
of an infrastructure project on the investment volume of this project, 
controlling for village effects with village dummies.7 Then we control for an 
additional set of project-specific factors, including project age, the sources of 
their funding as well as a number of other variables that measures the ways 
that projects within a village differ in terms of their initiation, the application 
process, design and implementation. In both models, we also included project 
type dummies to capture the differences in different types of projects as well 
as in the ways that different types of projects are scored. 
The results of the multivariate analysis of the quality–quantity relationship 
at the project level demonstrate that the models perform fairly well. The 
goodness of fit measures (R-square ranges from 0.72 to 0.79) are relatively 
high. The F-test of the joint significant test that the village dummies are 
needed to explain inter-village differences in quality (the focus of the analysis 
below) show that as a set the village dummies are highly significant. 
Interestingly, none of the project characteristics come up as significant.8  
When examining our coefficient of interest (on the project quantity 
variable), it is clear that the within village analysis leads us to a conclusion in 
which we reject the hypothesis that quality is being compromised when the 
quantity of infrastructure is expanding. In none of the two models is the 
coefficient on project investment variable negative (Table 2, row 1). In fact, 
in both regressions, the coefficients are positive and significant at least at the 
10 per cent level (columns 1 and 2). This means that on average the bigger 
project in each village is of somewhat higher quality.  
                                                 
7 Because of the nature of the way we constructed our variables, it can be shown that standard 
raw scores and adjusted scores are highly correlated and can both be used in our analysis as 
measures of infrastructure quality. Our data show that the correlation coefficient between the 
standard raw scores and adjusted scores is 0.92 (and significant at one per cent level). By this, 
we can have confidence that both standard raw scores and adjusted are related to each other. 
We also perform a sensitivity exercise to see how robust our findings are. Specifically, we used 
the adjusted scores instead of standard raw scores. In such a case we could not find any 
substantive difference in our basic findings that we got from using the quality measure of 
standard raw scores.  
8More detailed discussion and interpretations of these results are given in a companion essay 
titled “Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities”. In that paper, we seek to identify the 
determinants of quality, with a focus on examining which factors affect project quality more, 
project characteristics or village characteristics. 
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Table 2. Multivariate Results Examining the Relationship between the 
Quality and Quantity of Infrastructure at the PROJECT Level in Rural China 
 Dependent variable: Project Quality 
in Standard Raw Score  
 (1) (2) 
Project Quantity   
Project size in 1,000 Yuan 0.022 0.016 
 (3.43)*** (1.77)* 
Project characteristics   
project proposed by villagers, 1=yes, 0=no  16.719 
  (1.68) 
project proposed by villager committees, 1=yes, 0=no  11.345 
  (1.65) 
village committee applied the project, 1=yes, 0=no  -4.231 
  (0.68) 
Township or above government officials applied the project, 
1=yes, 0=no 
 12.386 
  (1.24) 
contractor designed the project, 1=yes, 0=no  -0.748 
  (0.08) 
Villagers implemented the project, 1=yes, 0=no  -2.717 
  (0.25) 
villager leaders implemented the project, 1=yes, 0=no  -20.521 
  (1.56) 
Township or above government implemented the project, 
1=yes, 0=no 
 -13.919 
  (1.28) 
contractors implemented the project, 1=yes, 0=no  0.025 
  (0.00) 
project funded by above only, 1=yes, 0=no  1.928 
  (0.23) 
project funded by village/farmers only, 1=yes, 0=no  -6.293 
  (0.99) 
Project age in month  0.107 
  (1.19) 
Project type dummies   
Road project, 1=yes, 0=no 3.359 3.129 
 (0.75) (0.56) 
Drinking water project, 1=yes, 0=no 10.782 10.164 
 (1.77)* (1.45) 
Village dummies YES YES 
Constant 59.773 54.434 
 (8.80)*** (3.12)*** 
Observations 154 153 
R-squared 0.72 0.79 
Robust t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Between village quality–quantity tradeoff 
Although we do not find any evidence that quality is being compromised at 
the project level, we still do not know whether this is so when examining 
between village differences. Before we proceed to test whether there is a 
negative quality–quantity relationship at the village level, however, we need 
to get measures for the quality and the quantity of infrastructure at the 
village level. For the quantity of infrastructure, it is relatively straightforward. 
Total (or average per year) village-level investment can be generated by 
adding up the total quantity of investment effort in value terms.  
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In contrast, it is relatively more complicated for two reasons to produce a 
measure of the total (or average) level of infrastructure quality in a village. 
First, in most of our villages (more than two-thirds of them) there were at 
least two infrastructure projects in which the measured level of quality varied 
significantly. For example, the quality of infrastructure projects in one village 
ranged from 28 to 80 out of 100 in terms of the standard raw score. In fact, 
in 10 per cent of our villages, there was at least a 40 percentage point gap 
between the project that scored the highest quality and the project that 
scored the lowest.  
Second, one must also consider how to weight each of the projects when 
producing a measure of the average level of quality. The basic problem is that 
infrastructure projects are denominated in different units (for example, 
kilometers of roads, hectares of irrigated area, the number of households 
getting access to drinking water). Therefore, unlike the case of investment 
quantity, there is no natural way of weighting the quality of infrastructure 
projects since the units in which they are denominated are not addable. 
Consequently, the fundamental challenge that we face is how to weight the 
quality of each infrastructure project to produce an average level of 
infrastructure quality for each sample village.  
Given these two considerations, there are two alternative weighting 
schemes that we use to produce a measure of the average level of 
infrastructure quality for each village. The first one, which is the least 
sophisticated one, is created by computing the simple average of the quality 
of infrastructure projects in the village. In other words, each infrastructure 
project—no matter what size or degree of complexity—is given a weight of 1. 
We call this type of measure the simple average.  
While this is one approach, in many cases it is easy to understand why a 
measure based on a simple average may not account for the fact that “not all 
projects are created equal”. In our sample, some infrastructure projects were 
big while others small. The average within village standard deviation of the 
project size for villages with more than two projects is 151 thousand yuan. 
Sometimes, the differences can be extreme. For example, the size of an 
infrastructure project in one village was 25 thousand yuan; the size of 
another project was 510 thousand yuan. In this case, if we used a simple 
average the weight of the quality of the 25 thousand yuan project would be 
the same as the weight of the 510 thousand yuan project. Hence, in cases in 
which there are large differences in the sizes of infrastructure projects within 
a village, we could also give more weight to the larger projects. Therefore, in 
addition to the simple average, we also produce an alternative measure that 
weights the quality of each infrastructure project in a village by its investment 
share. In the rest of the paper this is called the weighted-average measure. 
Using the different measures of the average quality and total quantity of 
infrastructure investment at the village level, we take two steps to examine 
whether quality is being compromised for quantity. First, we begin with a 
relatively simple, but transparent examination of descriptive statistics. We 
generate a simple bar chart comparing quality and quantity. We also use non-
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parametric analysis to examine whether or not there is a negative or positive 
correlation between quality and quantity.  
Second, and importantly, we also conduct multivariate analysis to examine 
in greater depth the relationship between quantity and quality by holding 
other things constant and looking at the net relationship between quantity 
and quality. In our analysis, we focus on the standard raw score of 
infrastructure project as it is the variable that is most highly correlated with 
farmer satisfaction.9 Because of the uncertainty over which weighting scheme 
we should be using for creating the measures of the average project quality in 
a village, we present the results from our analyses using both measures. 
Results of Descriptive Analysis 
Despite the concerns of some that the quality of infrastructure in rural China 
is being compromised for quantity (Yang et al., 2005; Huang and Xia, 2006), 
results from our descriptive analysis show at least a neutral relationship 
between the quality and quantity of infrastructure. As villages move from the 
lowest tercile when ranked in terms of volume of investment (that is, those 
villages that have received the lowest volume of investments) to the highest 
tercile, the standard raw score of infrastructure projects in a village increases 
from 66 to 76. This pattern suggests that there is a positive rather than 
negative relationship (Figure 4).  
Figure 4. Quality and Quantity of Infrastructure Projects at the Village Level 
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Source: Authors’ survey. 
                                                 
9 The analysis could easily be done with adjusted scores and the fundamental findings are 
identical. Moreover, the adjusted scores are not needed in the multivariate analysis since we can 
control for the adjustment factors by including them as right hand side variables in our regression 
equations. Results using adjusted scores are available from the authors upon request. 
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If the relationship between quality and quantity of infrastructure is non-
linear across quantity space, it would be important to identify the full range of 
the quality–quantity relationship. Hence, rather than aggregating measures 
into a comparison of two point estimates (as the bar chart does) 
nonparametric regression can be used. In this analysis we use a locally 
weighted regression or LOWESS estimator. Like other nonparametric analysis, 
LOWESS estimator has the benefit that it makes no assumptions about 
functional form, allowing the data to “speak for themselves” (Delgado and 
Robinson, 1992).  
Results from our non-parametric analysis suggest that there is no evidence 
that quality falls when the quantity of investment rises in a village. The 
smoothed scatter plot does not trace out a downward sloping curve (Figure 5). 
In fact, the plot seems to show that the relationship between quality and 
quantity of infrastructure, if anything, rises gradually at lower volumes of 
infrastructure investment. After 500 thousand yuan (which would mean for 
only the largest eight per cent of the projects in our sample villages), the 
smoothed curve flattens gradually. 
Figure 5. Correlation between Quality and Quantity of Infrastructure in 
Rural China, All Sample 
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Source: Authors’ survey. 
Multivariate Analyses 
To examine further the relationship between the quality and quantity of 
infrastructure in rural China, we do a series of multivariate analyses. We start 
simply, by regressing the mean standard raw scores of infrastructure projects 
in a village on the aggregate investment volume in the village, controlling for 
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the presence of different types of infrastructure projects in the village 
(Specification 1). Next, we control for an additional factor, the age of 
infrastructure projects, since it could be that quality deteriorates over time as 
part of the normal rate of depreciation (Specification 2). In Specification (3) 
we add a number of other variables that can explicitly control for the 
environment in which a project was constructed. In Specification (3), we add 
a number of other variables that should explicitly control for the environment 
in which a project was constructed. Finally, we replace the project 
environment variables used in specification (3) with the three additional 
control variables to account for the three adjustment factors (those that turn 
the standard raw score into the adjusted score and captures the complexity of 
the environment in which the project was designed and implemented), 
namely, physical difficulty, complexity and local participation factors. Finally, 
we replace the project environment variables used in specification (3) with 
the three additional control variables to account for the three adjustment 
factors (those that turn the standard raw score into the adjusted score and 
captures the complexity of the environment in which the project was designed 
and implemented), namely, physical difficulty, complexity and local 
participation factors. In summary, we are going to estimate the following four 
empirical specifications: 
Specification (1): 0 1 1i iQL QT Z i iα δ γ= + + + ε
iQT Z Age
 
Specification (2): iQL 0 1 1 1i i iα δ γ α ε= + + + +
i i
 
Specification (3): 0 1 1 1 2 2i i i iQL QT Z Age Zα δ γ α γ= + + + + +ε
i i
 
Specification (4): 0 1 1 1 3 3i i i iQL QT Z Age Zα δ γ α γ= + + + + +ε  
where, i is an index for the village; is a measure of the average quality of 
the three types of core infrastructure projects in village i; Age and Z
iQL
1, Z2 and 
Z3 are control variables that are measured as described in the next paragraph.  
To estimate empirically specifications (1) to (4) we need to define the 
exact variables used in each specification. As we noted earlier in this section, 
we actually have two alternative measures of infrastructure quality at the 
village level: the simple average quality, and weighted-average quality. The 
main explanatory variable of interest, , is the variable that measures the 
aggregate volume of investment into the three types of core infrastructure 
projects in each village (which makes δ the parameter of interest). Age
iQT
i is 
included to capture the average age of each infrastructure projects in months. 
The variable Z1i is a vector of dummy variables which help define the mix of 
the type of projects in each village. Specifically, the dummy variables indicate 
whether village i has road projects only, drinking water projects only, 
irrigation projects only, or some mix of core projects (that is, any two of the 
three types of projects or all three types of projects—in total there are seven 
variables in Z1).  
In addition, the specifications (3) and (4) contain a number of other control 
variables. The variable Z2i is a vector composed of the three adjustment 
factors: the degree of physical or geographical difficulty; the complexity of the 
project; and the degree to which local residents participated in the design and 
implementation of the project. The term Z3i is a vector of covariates that are 
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included to capture village characteristics, including the percentage of village 
land that has a slope greater than 25 degrees; the distance in kilometers 
between the two furthest small groups in the village; the distance in 
kilometers from the village committee to the township seat; the distance in 
kilometers from the village committee to the nearest road; two dummy 
variables indicating whether an infrastructure project was funded either by 
funds coming from above only or from funds coming from the village only. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the multivariate analyses are 
reported in Appendix Table 2. 
Results of Multivariate Analysis Using the Simple Average Measure of Quality 
The results of the multivariate analysis of the quality–quantity relationship 
that uses the simple average quality as the dependent variable demonstrate 
that the models perform fairly well and produce results that are mostly 
consistent with the descriptive analysis. The goodness of fit measures (R-
square ranges from 0.12 to 0.41) appear to be sufficiently high and rise as 
more covariates are controlled for. Some of the results also are consistent 
with our expectations. For example, in villages where a higher fraction of 
infrastructure projects is solely funded by villages themselves the quality 
index of the infrastructure projects tends to be lower (Table 3, Column 4). 
Similarly, the more autonomous was the village’s effort in the design and 
implementation of infrastructure projects, the poorer is the quality of 
infrastructure projects in their village. Both of these results are consistent 
with the finding of Khwaja (2002) who finds that quality suffers when villagers 
(who are not experts) get involved in technical matters. Another result that is 
consistent with our intuition is that the more physically challenging the terrain, 
the poorer the quality of the infrastructure (Column 3). Throughout our 
analysis, the results of Specifications (3) and (4) have a much higher 
goodness of fit (or R-square) statistic than Specifications (1) and (2), in part 
reflecting the importance of capturing the environment in which projects were 
constructed.  
When examining our coefficient of interest (on the investment quantity 
variable), the analysis leads us to a conclusion in which we reject the 
hypothesis that quality is being compromised when the quantity of 
infrastructure is expanding. In none of the four models is the coefficient on 
the investment quantity variable negative (Table 3, row 1). When we either 
use the simple regression model (specification 1) or control for the age the 
project (specification 2), the coefficient of interest is positive and significant at 
the 5 per cent level (columns 1 and 2). The coefficient remains positive, albeit 
they are insignificant, when we for the difficulty factors (column 3) or control 
for other project environment variables (column 4).10  
                                                 
10 While there is a positive measured relationship between quality and quantity (at least in models 
1 and 2, using simple average measure of quality), the magnitude of the rise in quality is small at 
the margin as quantity rises. This can be seen by examining the magnitudes of the coefficients. 
Across the four models the size of δ ranges from 0.003 to 0.006. This means that, everything else 
held constant, when the infrastructure investment in a village increases, the overall quality of 
infrastructure in that village actually improves slightly. According to the magnitude of the 
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Table 3. Multivariate Results Examining the Relationship between the Quality 
and Quantity of Infrastructure at the Village Level in Rural China, WHOLE 
Sample 
 Dependent variable: Unweighted Quality of 
Infrastructure in a Village 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aggregate investment in core infrastructure 
projects, 1,000 Yuan 
0.006 0.006 0.003 0.004 
 (2.18)** (2.15)** (1.35) (1.11) 
Attributes of an average core project     
Age in month of core projects  0.001 -0.020 -0.070 
  (0.02) (0.36) (0.95) 
Were core projects funded by above only?    -8.167 
    (1.54) 
Were core projects funded by village only?    -9.372 
    (2.57)** 
Were core projects implemented by above?    -1.515 
    (0.34) 
Adjustment factors:     
Geographical factor of core projects   -25.083  
   (3.99)***  
Completeness factor of core projects   10.914  
   (1.28)  
Participation factor of core projects   -24.321  
   (3.56)***  
Village characteristics     
% of hilly land over 25 degree in total land 
area in the village 
   -0.004 
    (0.07) 
the farest distance between two small groups 
within this village, km 
   -0.123 
    (0.23) 
the distance between village committee and 
township seat, km 
   -0.280 
    (0.82) 
the distance of the nearest road from the 
village seat, km 
   -0.017 
    (0.14) 
Dummy variables indicating presence of 
certain types of projects 
YES YES YES YES 
Constant 71.923 71.904 113.857 82.252 
 (13.77)*** (13.48)*** (6.71)*** (11.96)*** 
Observations 94 94 93 94 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.41 0.23 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses,* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
                                                                                                                                            
coefficients for the models using the investment share-weighted standard raw score as the 
dependent variables, in a village in which there is an increase of 100 thousand yuan of 
infrastructure investment (the average size of project in rural China is about 170 thousand yuan), 
the overall quality of infrastructure in a village rises by 0 (in the cases where the coefficients are 
insignificantly different from zero) to 0.6 point. This is equivalent to a rise in quality which is equal 
to four per cent of one standard deviation. In summary, at the very least we can say that, when 
we use the simple average of the quality of the projects in each village, quantity is not being 
expanded at the cost of quality; in fact, when we use some of the models, it is rising, albeit only 
fractionally. 
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The same basic results hold when we redo the same regressions that use 
the simple average measure of quality on a sub-sample of the villages that 
implemented at least one road infrastructure project. In this analysis we only 
include road projects (a homogeneous set of project types) in order to 
eliminate any problem that might be arising from our use of a more 
heterogeneous set of projects. Even when using only road projects, as above, 
we find that the measured relationship between quantity and quality is not 
negative. In all of the models, the coefficients on the road investment variable 
are all positive (Table 4, row 1). When we control for the physical difficulty, 
complexity and local participation factors, the coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 5 per cent level (column 3). This means that, everything else 
held constant, when the investment into the road network of a village 
increases, the overall quality of the road infrastructure in that village actually 
improves slightly. 
Table 4. Multivariate Results Examining the Relationship between the Quality 
and Quantity of Infrastructure at the Village Level in Rural China, ROAD Sub-
Sample 
 Dependent variable: Unweighted Quality of ROAD 
Infrastructure a Village 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aggregate investment in road projects, 1,000 
Yuan 
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 
 (1.40) (1.32) (2.46)** (1.45) 
Observations 81 81 82 80 
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.72 0.67 
     
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses,* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
Results of Multivariate Analysis Using the Weighted Average Measure of Quality 
In contrast to the descriptive findings and to the findings reported in Tables 3 
and 4 (which use the simple average quality measure), the results of the 
multivariate analysis that uses weighted average quality show that there is a 
negative relationship between quality and quantity of infrastructure in rural 
China (Table 5).11 The coefficient of interest, δ, is negative in all eight cases. 
In six out of the eight cases, the coefficient is statistically significant. The 
negative coefficient suggests that the quality of China’s rural infrastructure 
projects have fallen over time and that they are lower in places that have 
higher levels of spending on infrastructure investment.  
Hence, the differences between the regressions that use simple average 
quality and weighted average quality measures of the dependent variable 
(aggregate quality) suggest that how the measures of quality are created 
matters. While we are not sure exactly why it is that the results differ, one 
explanation is consistent with the interpretation that in villages in which there 
are small and large projects, the quality of the larger projects are low enough 
                                                 
11 In this section we report the results for eight regressions (for each of the four models—
Specifications 1 to 4—we run regressions using the whole sample and on the sample of those 
villages with road infrastructure projects). 
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(in relative terms) to eliminate, and even reverse, the positive relationship 
that is found in the simple average quality regressions. To test empirically 
whether such an explanation is valid in this analysis, we divided villages into 2 
types: those with projects that are all of similar size (type 1 villages), and 
villages with projects that vary in size (type 2 villages). In doing this, by “vary 
in size” we mean that the coefficient of variation of investment size of 
projects in a village is more than 0.4.12 With this classification system, we 
reran the version of specifications (1) to (4) that uses weighted quality 
measures as the dependent variable for type 1 and type 2 villages separately. 
Results from regressions using sub-samples of villages show that the 
coefficients on investment quantity variable remains negative in each of these 
regressions using the sub-sample of type 1 villages. Moreover, the coefficients 
are statistically different from zero in specifications (3) and (4). In contrast, 
the coefficients on investment quantity variable become positive in each of 
these regressions using the sub-sample of type 2 villages, and the coefficients 
are statistically significant from zero in specifications (1) and (2).13  
Table 5. Multivariate Results Examining the Relationship between the Quality 
and Quantity of Infrastructure at the Village Level in Rural China 
 Dependent variable: Investment Share weighted 
Quality of Infrastructure a Village 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
WHOLE sample     
Aggregate investment in infrastructure projects, 
1,000 Yuan 
-0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.012 
 (1.02) (1.32) (2.70)*** (2.63)** 
Observations 95 94 93 92 
R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.72 0.63 
     
ROAD Sub-Sample  
Aggregate investment in road projects, 1,000 
Yuan 
-0.034 -0.035 -0.032 -0.037 
 (4.46)*** (4.57)*** (4.30)*** (4.45)*** 
Observations 79 79 78 78 
R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.63 0.60 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses,* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
Perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that, although the coefficients 
are negative, their magnitudes are small in all of the regressions using the 
weighted measures of quality. Specifically, the coefficients from the 
regressions using all of the core projects (and using the entire sample of 
                                                 
12 The coefficient of variation is simply the standard deviation of a variable divided by the mean. 
The coefficient of variation on investment quantity variable ranges from 0 to 1.88. One thing that 
needs to be considered in classifying sample villages in this way is to make sure that we have 
enough sample villages to run regressions using these two types of villages separately. 
13 We also tried other cut-off values of coefficient of variation to classify our sample villages into 
type 1 and type 2. Regardless of the cutoff values, the coefficients on investment quantity 
variable remains negative in each of these regressions that uses the sub-sample of type-1 villages. 
However, for the regressions that uses the sub-sample of type-2 villages, the coefficient on 
investment quantity variable become positive in three out of four cases when the cutoff is set at 
0.5; positive in tow out of four cases when the cutoff is set at 0.6, 0.7, 1.0, and 1.3, respectively.  
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villages) range from -0.006 to -0.012. For a typical village in our sample, the 
aggregate infrastructure investment is 464 thousand yuan, with a standard 
deviation of 473 (Appendix Table 2). In the typical village, the average 
investment share-weighted quality is 73 (out of 100 points). The standard 
deviation of the quality variable is 13 points. According to the magnitude of 
the coefficients for the models using the weighted average models, in a 
village in which there is an increase of 100 thousand yuan of infrastructure 
investment, the overall quality of infrastructure in a village would fall by 0.6–
1.2 points. This is equivalent to fall in quality which is equal to less than 10 
per cent (or, more exactly, 5 to 9 per cent) of one standard deviation. With 
coefficients of this size, the magnitude of the quantity-quality tradeoff is 
almost negligible.  
The pictures of the projects can also be used to illustrate the nature of the 
difference in projects that large and small using a bit naïve (but perhaps 
revealing) way. We do so by lining up all of photos of all of projects and 
ranking them by their quality scores. After doing so, it is virtually impossible 
to detect a difference in quality of projects that are 3 to 5 points apart, not to 
mention those that are much less than 1 point apart. In other words, when 
looking at our results from the descriptive analysis, when looking at our 
results from the multivariate analysis using the simple average quality as the 
dependent variable, and when looking at the results of the multivariate 
analysis using the weighted average quality as the dependent variable, quality 
in any real sense is not being compromised.  
Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used data that our collaborators in China have 
collected to create profiles of the quantity and the quality of infrastructure in 
rural China. The main question that we are interested in exploring is whether 
or not investment quality is being compromised when the quantity of 
infrastructure is expanding in rural China. Our short answer to this question is 
that quality is not being compromised—at least not in any material way. In 
fact, using descriptive results, we have discovered that in recent years both 
the quantity and the quality of infrastructure in rural China increase over time 
and vary across space. Moreover, contrary to the concern expressed by some 
(Zhao, 2005; Ma and Fang, 2005), the quality of infrastructure in rural China 
is not being compromised for its quantity expansion during the entire sample 
period. 
So why is it that quality is rising over time? According to our data the 
average quality of China’s projects went up by 2 points between 1998 and 
2003 when using the standard raw score measure of quality (10 points when 
using the adjusted score measure). We have concluded that quality is not 
rising with the expansion of quantity, so what is causing it? Looking to the 
other factors in Specification 4, we find that the main coefficient that is 
significant is the one that is associated with the village-funded only variable. 
Moreover, the coefficient is negative and significant, meaning that the quality 
of projects is lower in villages with more village-funded-only projects. Since 
the share of village-funded only projects have fallen over time (from 49 per 
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cent in 1998 to 40 per cent in 2004) and the share of projects that are funded 
by the government above only have risen (from 10 per cent to 24 per cent 
during the same period), at least in part this is accounting for some of the 
observed rise in quality. From this point of view, far from criticizing the 
leadership for pushing too many projects too fast (as some have), leaders 
should be praised for being able to increase quality while they have expanded 
infrastructure investment.  
However, there are two points that we think worthy of noting here. One 
point is that, although our data show that most farmers in sample villages are 
satisfied with infrastructure delivered to their villages, our field survey shows 
that farmers said they still need more infrastructure, and they still want 
better-quality infrastructure. The other point is that, although our data show 
that both the quantity and the quality of infrastructure in rural China are 
rising during the sample period, if we compare China with its neighboring 
nations in East Asia (empirically, Japan and South Korea) at certain points of 
their development path, we see that China still faces challenges in improving 
its rural infrastructure. Therefore, while there has been progress, from a 
comparative perspective the process in China is just beginning and needs to 
be followed up by a long-term commitment to make massive and sustained 
investments in rural areas to provide more and better-quality infrastructure.  
If this is true, at the same time that praise is being given to China’s leaders 
for their efforts, they should also be encouraged to continue along the same 
path and expand future investment in rural infrastructure—while trying to 
maintain or even improve quality. In fact, it appears that this is exactly where 
this country is heading. According to the new 11th five-year plan (NDRC, 
2006), China is committing itself and is actually in the process of making 
massive additional new investments in rural infrastructure. Leaders should 
make every effort to meet and exceed the plan in volume and continue its 
efforts to improve project quality. 
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Appendix Table 1. Mean of Adjustment Factors by Category 
Category Geographical difficulty Complexity 
Local 
participation 
Adjustment 
weight 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)=(1)+(2) +(2) 
Section A: Province 
Jiangsu 1.08 1.24 1.26 3.58 
Sichuan 1.18 1.16 1.32 3.67 
Shaanxi 1.39 1.39 1.37 4.14 
Jilin 1.07 1.27 1.14 3.48 
Hebei 1.03 1.35 1.26 3.64 
Section B: Project inception year 
1998/99 1.20 1.26 1.29 3.76 
2003/04 1.15 1.26 1.29 3.71 
Section C: Project type 
Roads  1.17 1.28 1.26 3.71 
Drinking water 1.24 1.30 1.36 3.90 
Irrigation 1.10 1.23 1.30 3.63 
All Sample 1.16 1.27 1.29 3.72 
Source: Authors’ survey. 
Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in Multivariate 
Analyses  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Average standard raw score of infrastructure projects 73.3 12.7 
   
Aggregate investment in infrastructure projects, 1,000 Yuan 463.7 473.4 
Average project age in month 26.5 19.1 
Fraction of infrastructure projects funded by above only 0.1 0.3 
Fraction of infrastructure projects funded by village only 0.5 0.4 
Fraction of infrastructure projects implemented by village only 0.7 0.3 
Geographical factor of core projects 1.1 0.2 
Completeness factor of core projects 1.3 0.1 
Participation factor of core projects 1.3 0.2 
   
% of hilly land over 25 degree in total land area in the village 23.6 27.5 
the farest distance between two small groups within this village, km 2.4 2.6 
the distance between village committee and township seat 5.0 3.9 
the distance of the nearest road from the village seat 5.5 10.8 
   
Village has road project, 1=yes 0.34 0.48 
Village has drinking water project, 1=yes 0.07 0.26 
Village has irrigation project, 1=yes 0.05 0.22 
Village has road + drinking water project, 1=yes 0.10 0.31 
Village has road + irrigation project, 1=yes 0.31 0.47 
Village has drinking water + irrigation project, 1=yes 0.01 0.10 
Village has road + drinking water + irrigation project, 1=yes  0.10 0.31 
 
 
